¿Nuevas formas de gobierno empresarial? Activismo e influencia de terceras partes interesadas en la información económico-financiera

Beatriz García-Osma; Cristina Grande-Herrera

doi:10.18543/bee.2561

Beatriz García-Osma Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, España https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6600-8342
Cristina Grande-Herrera Bayes Business School. City, University of London, United Kingdom https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9360-1504

Palabras clave: influencia, gobierno empresarial, terceras partes interesadas, usuarios de la información económico-financiera

Resumen

El activismo emerge en fechas recientes como un nuevo potencial mecanismo de gobierno corporativo de las empresas. Si bien la influencia de terceras partes interesadas y fundamentalmente, de los inversores institucionales, es aún limitada en Europa, su creciente rol en otros países sugiere la posibilidad de una gran importancia futura. En este trabajo se ofrece una panorámica de la evidencia académica sobre este fenómeno reciente, centrándonos en cómo el activismo influye en la información económico-financiera preparada por las empresas. Concluimos el trabajo con algunas reflexiones sobre posibles implicaciones para profesionales y reguladores.

Recibido: 16 septiembre 2022
Aceptado: 26 septiembre 2022

Biografía del autor/a

Beatriz García-Osma, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, España

Catedrática de Universidad en el Departamento de Economía de la Empresa de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Research Member del ECGI y profesora visitante en Stockholm School of Economics. Previamente, fue profesora Titular de Universidad en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid y Marie Curie pre- y post-doctoral fellow en la Universidad de Lancaster, donde obtuvo su doctorado en Economía Financiera y Contabilidad. Su investigación se centra en el estudio de la calidad de la información financiera, gobierno corporativo y la relación entre la información financiera y los mercados de capitales. Beatriz ha publicado su investigación en revistas nacionales e internacionales de prestigio, y ha participado y dirigido numerosos proyectos de investigación. Su docencia se centra en las áreas de Contabilidad Financiera, Valoración de Empresas y Análisis de Estados Financieros. Fue la representante de España en el Board de la European Accounting Association (EAA), entre 2014 y 2020 y miembro del Management Committee de la EAA entre 2014 y 2017. Es editora de la European Accounting Review (2020-2023) y fue editora de la Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, y miembro del editorial panel de diversas revistas.

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